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ABSTRACT 
 
BEFORE THE FLOOD WASHES IT AWAY: THE ROAD 
CONNECTING URBAN & REGIONAL PLANNING AND 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLANNING 
MAY 2020 
IAN P. CYR 
B.A., WESTFIELD STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.R.P., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Elizabeth Brabec 
 
This master’s thesis examines the relationship between emergency management 
planning and comprehensive land use planning. The incorporation of emergency 
management practices into the comprehensive planning process allows for a better 
understanding of the impact of development, zoning, building code, and economic 
development on the mitigation of hazards that face the community. Academic curricula 
may provide a brief introduction of the relationship between hazard mitigation and land 
use; however, a more detailed exploration of how emergency management planning and 
regional or urban planning are interrelated is needed. The impact of weather-related 
events, natural disasters, or other human-caused shock or disruption can dramatically 
impact the physical, social, and psychological structures of a community. This research 
provides regional planners with the history of emergency management planning in the 
United States. It examines how cross-sharing of information and process between both 
planning disciplines can contribute to more robust community development and disaster 
plans. A case study illustrates the impact of urban development on natural hazard 
iv  
mitigation and the subsequent risks to public safety, which resulted from the planning 
decisions. Place identity, place dependence, and public participation concerning hazard 
mitigation and disaster management are explored to provide planners and emergency 
managers with a context of the psychological influences which may impact a community 
v  
member’s decisions when faced with significant disruption of place. Best practices that 
guide the integration of regional planning and emergency management planning are 
provided to increase the understanding of both planning processes to increase the 
capacity of a community to absorb and rebound from a natural disaster or sudden shock. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Regional planners should understand the emergency management planning 
process as both planning efforts rely on and can impact each other. The incorporation of 
emergency management practices into the comprehensive planning process allows for a 
better understanding of the impact of development, zoning, building code, and economic 
development on the mitigation of hazards that face the community. Academic curricula 
may provide a brief introduction of the relationship between hazard mitigation and land 
use; however, a more detailed exploration of how emergency management planning and 
regional or urban planning are interrelated is needed. The impact of weather-related 
events, natural disasters, or other human-caused shock or disruption can dramatically 
impact the physical, social, and psychological structures of a community. This research 
provides regional planners with the history of emergency management planning int the 
United States. It examines how cross-sharing of information and process between both 
planning disciplines can contribute to more robust community development and disaster 
plans. A case study illustrates the impact of urban development on natural hazard 
mitigation and the subsequent risks to public safety, which resulted from the planning 
decisions. Place identity, place dependence, and public participation concerning hazard 
mitigation and disaster management are explored to provide planners and emergency 
managers with a context of the psychological influences which may impact a community 
member’s decisions when faced with significant disruption of place. Best practices that 
guide the integration of regional planning and emergency management planning are 
provided to increase the understanding of both planning processes to increase the 
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capacity of a community to absorb and rebound from a natural disaster or sudden shock. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature discussing the intersection of 
emergency management, theory, the emergency management planning process and 
comprehensive land use plans. Examining the literature on these topics establishes the 
critical context that grounds this thesis research and informs the interpretation of results, 
as well as the resulting discussion and recommendations. 
Disasters occur with regular frequency in the United States. Floods, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and tornados are only a few events that impact various communities within 
the country. The impact of these events may include physical damage, loss of life, 
number of displaced persons, and economic loss. While there is no guarantee that 
residents who are displaced or impacted as a result of such events will return and 
rebuild this phase of disaster recovery is critical to supporting the broader social and 
economic efforts to restore the viability of impacted communities (Quarantelli, 1999). 
Definitions 
 
For consistency and brevity, the term "planner" will be used to describe Urban 
or Regional planners and those who are responsible for the creation of comprehensive 
or master plans for a given community, city, etc. The terms "emergency management" 
and "hazard mitigation" are used to describe the process of assessing risks to the 
community and developing appropriate plans to address those risks (FEMA, 2004). 
"Natural disaster" is used to describe severe natural weather events such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes, and wildfires (FEMA, 2004). The term "sudden shock" is used to describe 
acute emergencies such as gas explosions, acts of terror, or other rapidly occurring 
events where there is a significant loss of life or disruption to the community (FEMA, 
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2010). Sudden shocks are rapid; however, there may be known risk factors such as a 
fuel storage facility, hazardous material location, or failing infrastructure that should 
provide planners and emergency managers with advanced notice of concern. "Disaster" 
is often the term associated with these events and may or may not be inclusive of a 
nationally declared disaster, which is a policy mechanism to invoke management or 
financial assistance from State or Federal government entities. This language is not 
inclusive of all types of disasters or sudden shock, nor is it intended to diminish the 
significance of an event on the affected community. 
 
 
Recovery 
 
Smith and Wenger (2007) define disaster recovery as the "differential process of 
restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic and natural 
environment through pre-event planning and post-event actions" (237). Rumbach and 
Foley (2014) state that recent research on community recovery post-disaster, especially 
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, presents powerful evidence that recovery is often a 
function of community input, power, and capacity, but the impact on individual 
households is less clear (e.g., Haas et al. 1977; Kweit and Kweit 2004; Olshansky and 
Johnson 2010; Smith 2012; Kim and Olshansky 2015). Regardless of physical location 
Quarantelli (1999) shows that disaster recovery varies due to the social characteristics 
of victims such as socioeconomic status, age, knowledge, and social positioning (57). 
Enarson and Fordham (2001) show similar findings by race, ethnicity, and gender. 
Olshansky, Johnson, and Topping (2006) describe "considerable consensus" in the 
disaster recovery literature that the "higher the socioeconomic level, the more likely 
households, and businesses are to recover to pre-disaster levels" (356). Additionally, 
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there is a well-documented connection between social vulnerability and environmental 
exposure, as low-income and marginalized communities tend to be disproportionately 
located in hazardous areas (e.g., Adger 2005; Dewan 2013; Peacock et al. 2015; Sherly 
et al. 2015). 
The Role of Governance 
 
Disaster recovery is, in many respects, a function of local governance, and how 
a local government represents its constituents and the decisions it makes play a central 
role in the recovery trajectory of individual households  (Rumbach & Foley, 2014). 
Olshansky, Johnson, & Topping (2006) find that local leadership is critical to a 
successful recovery. Effective leaders can provide vision, work with community 
organizations, and act as a bridge between citizens and other government agencies, 
among other roles (see also Prater, Peacock, Arlikatti, & Grover, 2006; Smith, 2011). 
Specific to disaster management, local governance over disasters and disaster recovery 
varies widely in terms of capacity, coordination between agencies and organizations, 
and views on the appropriate role of local government (Olshanksy, Johnson, and 
Topping 2006; Dewan 2013). Local governments with pre-existing expertise in key 
recovery areas such as community planning, social services, or housing development 
can act more quickly and with less reliance on outside resources than those without this 
background or experience (Rumbach & Foley, 2014). 
The Importance of Participatory Planning Processes 
 
While a strong local government is helpful, there must be a focus on local 
leadership engaging the public before the disaster. Historically, governmental guidance 
was provided by agencies that have been constructed from military models and include 
an authoritarian, top-down approach (FEMA, 2004). Participation must be approached 
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from the bottom-up and achieve acceptance and cooperation from community 
participants to be effective (Creighton, 2012). The goal is to engage the public to build a 
knowledgeable constituency, able to create a plan that reflects local values, needs, and 
capabilities, and enable ongoing public input throughout the recovery process (Berke, 
Cooper, Aminto, Grabich, & Horney, 2014). Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, (2010) argue 
that community recovery is, in part, dependent on "preparedness and mitigation efforts 
taken pre-storm, and the capacity (economic, social, and institutional) of the 
community" (64). Local leaders and planning professionals should evaluate 
communities that are at risk for disaster impact and develop strategies that engage the 
community in a dialog. This dialogue should discuss the risks, the required planning 
efforts to ensure life and property safety, the expected government and community 
actions during the disaster, and how the community will recover and rebuild from any 
damage sustained by the disaster. 
The Role of Social Capital & Civic Capacity 
 
Social capital has different meanings among different areas of study. In general 
terms, social capital refers to the social relationships and social structures that have 
productive benefits (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). Social capital has multiple positive effects 
on household resilience to disasters and household and community recovery (Onyx & 
Bullen, 2000). During times of crisis, neighbors with strong ties look out for one 
another and share emotional, material, and logistical support (Klinenberg 2015; 
Rumbach and Foley 2014). 
Civic capacity refers to shared goals and values and the ability to work 
collectively using resources that allow communities to establish and achieve shared 
goals, mobilize political and financial capital, and adapt to change. As the core of 
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community resilience, this is critical not only to recovery from disasters but in 
responding to the ongoing economic, political, and social changes faced by cities and 
neighborhoods (Seideman, 2013). Each community, even each neighborhood, will bring 
varying skills and talents held by residents in its population. During disaster and 
recovery, these pre-existing skills and knowledge bases will need to be honed and 
expanded. Furthermore, where there are knowledge and skill gaps within a community, 
these capabilities will have to be developed (Fung, 2008). 
The resilience of a household can be supported through local governance 
activities like promoting cultures of volunteerism, creating more robust and inclusive 
planning cultures, developing pre-disaster plans and policies, and improving the 
relationships between vulnerable populations and their local governments (Rumbach, 
2015). Government leaders and planning professionals can use public participation 
strategies to promote broader community participation in planning and empower local 
action to facilitate buy-in and, in turn, increase community capacity to prepare for and 
respond to a disaster (FEMA, 2011). 
After a significant catastrophe, confidence is often shaken. It is a major 
commitment to return to a place where everything is lost and put the time, money, and 
emotional investment into rebuilding. Even in disasters where recovery is speedy and 
well-funded, some residents choose not to return (Fung, 2008). Minority communities 
often face specific challenges when deciding to return to disaster-damaged 
communities. For African Americans, the decision to return to their original home is not 
directly influenced by the damage of a disaster, but rather, they make their decisions 
based on political trust (Jamali & Nejat, 2016). Deeply embedded patterns of gender, 
racial/ethnic, and class stratification and segregation shape the relative vulnerability of 
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residents to extreme events like floods, their capacity to recover from flood effects, and 
their power to engage in community reconstruction (Enarson, 2001). 
The Role of Public Participation 
 
Public participation is the process by which public concerns, needs, and values 
are incorporated into governmental and corporate decision making (Creighton, 2005). It 
is an interactive process that considers the level of impact or influence on the decisions 
made by government or private organizations. Leaders at the community, local, and 
state levels can use public participation strategies to increase fruitful dialogue among 
stakeholders. Tools described in texts such as The Public Participation Handbook 
(Creighton, 2005), and FEMA's The Whole Community Approach (2011) can serve as a 
guide to leaders to develop strategies to improve engagement with communities, 
especially those communities that lack resources—understanding the community 
complexity, recognizing community capabilities and needs, while fostering 
relationships with community leaders helps to build and maintain partnerships, which 
empowers local action (FEMA, 2011). 
Integrating Emergency Management and Master Plans 
 
The process of integrating emergency management and master plans is specific 
to an individual community. It depends on the known hazards, coupled with the range 
of planning processes and tools that influence how the built environment is exposed to 
those hazards (FEMA, 2013). Effective integration of hazard mitigation occurs when a 
community's planning framework leads to development patterns that do not increase 
risks from known hazards or leads to redevelopment that reduces risk from known 
hazards (Schwab, 2010). Frequently, emergency managers lead mitigation planning 
efforts but may not always take advantage of the unique expertise that community 
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development or zoning officials can bring to bear in the preparation of these plans 
(Schwab, 2010). Community planners share the responsibility to seek out their 
emergency management counterparts and become part of the emergency management 
team to determine what shared values and potential solutions jointly work best for their 
community (Schwab, 2010). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature serves as important context as preparation before a disaster and 
recovery after a disaster are related. Planning professionals, emergency management 
experts and policymakers must understand the relationship between hazard mitigation 
and land use planning process. Without an understanding of the relationship, 
practitioners working in these areas cannot make fully informed decisions about the 
effects that their individual plans may have on their communities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research methodology for this 
qualitative study regarding the relationship between emergency management planning 
processes and land use or master planning processes. This approach allowed for a 
deeper understanding of the benefits of incorporating various aspects of the respective 
planning processes to create more robust and comprehensive plans and it provided a 
way to identify potential gaps in the respective planning processes. 
 
 
This study builds a theory in answer to the following research questions: 
 
• How does the relationship between emergency management plans and 
comprehensive or land use plans influence community preparation for, 
response to a disaster? 
• How can the relationship between these separate plans be improved to 
increase community capacity to absorb and recover from a disaster? 
The relationship between emergency planning processes and comprehensive 
land use planning processes is often weak due to a siloed approach when creating the 
individual plan. A contributing factor to this disconnect is a lack of awareness or 
understanding of the respective and concurrent planning process. The two planning 
processes are different yet share common attributes that practitioners can use to 
increase collaboration and understanding between the two planning processes.   Lack 
of coordination between the two planning processes affects the overall efficacy of the 
individual plans and may result in a weakened capacity for a community to absorb and 
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recover from a disaster or sudden shock to the community. Lack of coordination may 
influence government decision making, and community stakeholder's ability to 
recover from a disaster. Governing bodies such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and the American Planning Association both identify the gap 
between the two planning processes and have created guidance and strategies to 
increase collaboration. 
This project explores the relationship between emergency management 
planning and comprehensive land use or master planning to learn more about how 
planners and emergency managers can work more collaboratively to increase overall 
community resilience and capacity to mitigate and recover from a disaster. 
The methodology incorporated two approaches: a review of the literature 
focusing on relevant research publications, training documents, and educational 
guides; and a case study of emergency management and planning outcomes. This 
approach contributes to the researcher's practical and academic experience in 
emergency management and regional planning disciplines. 
Existing literature sources were collected and reviewed. The data was sourced 
from online publications of scholarly research, including journal articles, textbooks, 
and other research documents to understand the existing academic research regarding 
this relationship. Government documents such as educational texts from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and congressional reports were also reviewed to 
understand the position of the emergency management community regarding the 
inclusion of regional or land use planning in those efforts. Educational resources from 
governing bodies like the American Planning Association were reviewed to 
understand the position of regional planning practitioners concerning the inclusion of 
12  
emergency management in their planning processes. 
 
The literature selected focused on material produced after 2001 because of 
substantial changes to the field of emergency management after the 9/11 terror attacks 
in the United States. Data sources before 2001 were consulted to provide historical 
context when appropriate. 
A case study was conducted to explore the outcomes which may result from a 
lack of collaboration between emergency management planning and comprehensive 
land use planning. This case study was selected because it illustrated the impact of a 
siloed planning approach on the affected community, which threatened the physical 
and social rebuilding of the community. 
Limitations 
 
Due to a change in focus of this research and compressed time allowances, 
surveys of emergency management, and land use planning, practitioners were not able 
to be conducted. Additionally, there was no direct analysis of related planning 
documents to determine to what extent there is, or is not, a collaborative relationship 
between existing emergency management and comprehensive land use plans. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE STUDY- BROADMOOR, NEW ORLEANS 
 
 
This research used a case study of the impact of planning and disaster 
management post-Hurricane Katrina on the Broadmoor neighborhood of New Orleans, 
Louisiana. This neighborhood was chosen because even though, like much of the city, 
Katrina left high floodwaters and significant property damage in her wake, Broadmoor 
faced a unique repopulation and rebuilding challenges. This challenge is discussed in 
greater detail, and it serves as the backdrop of the discussion about planning and 
emergency management. 
It is important to provide a contextual, though limited, history of development 
within New Orleans. The planning, land use, and engineering used to transform the 
geography and natural environment to spur developments within the city were innovative 
and, at the time, a technological marvel that enabled impressive growth. However, it is 
likely the cause of the continued challenges that the city faces concerning water 
management and increased risk of future flooding. 
Settling New Orleans- Below Sea Level? 
 
The Mississippi River has created most of Louisiana through natural sediment 
deposits and naturally occurring changes of direction in its quest to reach the Gulf of 
Mexico by the shortest and steepest gradient (McPhee & Kolbert, 1989). In his article 
"How Humans Sank New Orleans," Tulane University Geographer Richard Campenella 
(2018) details how the efforts to remove groundwater from the city have contributed to 
an increased risk of flooding. He describes that naturally occurring flooding of the 
Mississippi River deposited coarse sediment along the riverbanks and progressively finer 
deposits farther away from the river. Areas near the river were higher in elevation, and 
14  
areas farther from the river remained lower in elevation with a high water table. Most of 
these areas remained swampland and marsh. As the colonists started the development of 
the city, which serves as a major industrial port, they built upon the riverbanks, and other 
naturally developed higher ground. The proximity of swampland to inhabitants created 
hygiene, and health issues, specifically insect-borne illnesses, and many inhabitants saw 
the swamp and marsh as a source of illness and a constant strain on growth and 
prosperity. Campanella states that at this time, the early 1700s, the city of New Orleans, 
including the swamps and marshes, was above sea level. 
Increased settlement and development were routinely in conflict with the natural 
deltaic process of flooding, and strategies to remove groundwater and floodwater were 
developed Campanella, (2018). As the river lengthens toward the Gulf of Mexico, the 
gradient lessens, and the river slows, developing more sand and silt buildups, which 
eventually causes the river to spill to one side or another (McPhee & Kolbert, 1989). 
Early efforts were simple drainage ditches created by property owners, which used 
gravity to channel water to the lower areas of the city, predominately north of the 
Mississippi River. In the 1830s, improved engineering and design brought the advent of 
steam-powered pumps which provided a limited capacity to pump excess groundwater 
out of low-lying areas, into a system of drainage ditches and ultimately toward Lake 
Ponchartrain to the north. This drainage system was adequate; however, increased 
capacity was desired, and the city undertook a process to develop a more robust drainage 
system. Campanella (2018) states that the city became more serious toward addressing 
groundwater issues and, in the late 1800s, used surveyors for the first time to map the 
topography and elevations of locations. As a result of this mapping, in 1895, a system of 
canals was designed to remove groundwater from areas of the city, and it also revealed 
15  
that some areas had, for the first time dipped below sea level. 
 
With the technology and support to develop drainage systems, the effort to rid the 
city of swamp and marsh began and, in a very short period, transformed the geographical 
landscape. Campanella (2018) states, 
"Construction of the new drainage system began in 1896 and accelerated in 1899 
when voters overwhelmingly approved a two-mill property tax to create the New 
Orleans Sewerage and Water Board. By 1905, 40 miles of canal had been excavated, 
hundreds of miles of pipelines and drains had been laid, and six pumping stations 
were draining up to 5,000 cubic feet of water per second. System efficacy improved 
dramatically after 1913 when a young engineer named Albert Baldwin Wood 
designed an enormous impeller pump that could discharge water even faster. Eleven 
wood screw pumps were installed by 1915, and many are still in use today. By 1926, 
over 30,000 acres of land had been reclaimed via 560 miles of pipes and canals with a 
capacity of 13,000 cubic feet of water per second. New Orleans had finally conquered 
its back swamp." (para. 16) 
The successful drainage of the swampland allowed for increased growth and 
building opportunities. "Developers promoted expansion, newspapers heralded it, the 
City Planning Commission encouraged it, the city built streetcars to service it, [and] the 
banks and insurance companies underwrote the financing." (Campanella, 2018, para. 19). 
There was a period of white flight during this time where middle-class whites relocated 
to newly developed lakefront locations. The drainage also affected the architecture of 
newly created homes. The canals and pumps had not stopped the flooding, but the public 
perception was that the technology had prevented and mitigated flood damage by 
removing excess water. No longer were homes built on pilings above the ground. Homes 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Subsidence in the New Orleans Metro Area. 
Source: Richard Campanella, 2018 
in many of the newly developed areas were constructed on concrete slabs at grade. 
 
 
 
A Different Kind of Settlement 
 
The removal of groundwater from the city was slowly creating another concern 
for the development of the city. Campanella (2018) states that "what was beginning to 
happen was anthropogenic soil subsidence—the sinking of the land by human action 
(Figure 1). When runoff is removed, and 
artificial levees prevent the river from 
overtopping, the groundwater lowers, the 
soils dry out, and the organic matter 
decays. All this creates air pockets in the 
soil body, into which those sand, silt, and 
clay particles settle, consolidate—and 
drop below sea level."(para.15). Subsidence continued even as more and more people 
moved into subsiding areas. While most New Orleans's 300,000 residents lived above sea 
level in the early 1900s, only 48 percent remained above the water in 1960, when the 
city's population peaked at 627,525. That year, 321,000 residents lived on a former 
swamp, over which time they dropped into a series of topographical bowls four to seven 
feet below sea level. (Campanella, 2018) 
Most Americans likely believe that New Orleans was built below sea level, which 
is, in part, correct, but it did not start that way. According to Campanella's account, the 
impact of technology, planning, and development served to be much more destructive 
than the natural weather events that impact the city. Subsidence cannot be stopped. As it 
continues, the city will continue to face challenges such as buckling road surfaces, 
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sinking foundations, ruptured gas lines, and increased risk to higher flood levels even 
despite zoning and building code adjustments to mitigate risks. 
In 1965, rainfall from Hurricane Betsy overtopped existing levees and flooded the 
low-lying basins in the city (Rosenthal, n.d.). Congress established the Flood Control Act 
of 1965, which, among other issues, gave authority for the design and construction of the 
flood protection in the New Orleans metropolitan area to the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers. After 1965, the corps built a levee system around a much larger geographic 
footprint that included previous marshland and swamp. The creation of new levees and 
improved pumping technology increased the buildable land in the city. Many new 
subdivisions were developed to cater to those who preferred a more suburban lifestyle 
but were open to remaining within the city limits of New Orleans (Rosenthal, n.d.). 
Broadmoor Neighborhood 
 
New Orleans is a city that defines itself by its individual and unique 
neighborhoods (New Orleans.com, 2020). Each neighborhood has a distinct identity and 
flavor that complements the overall feeling of the city called "The Big Easy." As a very 
old city, large old-growth oak trees line most of the major streets. The architecture of 
homes is distinctly New Orleans; shotgun homes, cottages, and townhouses that reflect a 
deep history of French, Caribbean, and Spanish roots. There are 13 identified planning 
districts within the city and approximately 72 individual neighborhoods (New 
Orleans.com, 2020). The Broadmoor neighborhood is in the Uptown/Carrolton District 
and is approximately two miles west of the French Quarter and two miles away from the 
banks of the Mississippi River. 
The Broadmoor neighborhood is 358 acres (.5 sq. mi.) situated in a low-lying 
basin between the high ground of the Mississippi River's natural levee and the Metairie 
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Ridge (Figure 2). With an elevation of of 2 feet above sea level, Broadmoor was 
originally part of the city's back 
swamps, which would often flood, 
creating a 12-acre lake. It was 
considered a favorite fishing 
location for New Orleanians and 
remained mostly undeveloped until the 
 
early twentieth century (Seidman, 
2013). The first area drainage 
canals were built in 1885. A 
pumping station at Broad Street and Washington within the Broadmoor boundaries 
opened in 1903. In 1915, pumps more powerful than previous ones were established at 
that pumping station. After 1915, smaller groups of people began settling the area. 
(Seidman, 2013). 
Before Hurricane Katrina, Broadmoor had 7,232 residents living in 2,915 
households, equal to 1.5 percent of New Orleans' population (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2000). Broadmoor reflected the demographic makeup of New Orleans as a whole. It was 
68 percent black and 26 percent white, compared to roughly 67 percent black and 27 
percent white for all of Orleans Parish (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). It had roughly the 
same number of homeowners. Forty-eight percent of its 2,915 housing units were 
owner‐occupied, but it was somewhat poorer than the city overall, with an average 
household income in 2000 of $36,400, compared to about $43,200 for Orleans Parish. 
Almost 32 percent of households in Broadmoor lived in poverty, and fully 22 percent 
reported total household incomes of less than $10,000 a year (Scott, Fung, 2008). 
Figure 2: Neighborhoods in Orleans Parish. Source: Joy 
Bonaguro 
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Broadmoor Improvement Association 
 
The Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) was established in 1930 as the 
Broadmoor Civic Improvement Association to address the needs of the developing 
Broadmoor neighborhood (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2019). It was 
incorporated in 1970 as the Broadmoor Improvement Association, Inc. to stop 
"blockbusting" in Broadmoor, which was a well-established, multi-racial/multi-ethnic 
community already living in harmony (The Broadmoor Project, 2007). Even so, by the 
late 1970s, the neighborhood had substantially deteriorated (Broadmoor Improvement 
Association, 2019). Undaunted, BIA partnered with the nonprofit Neighborhood Housing 
Services of New Orleans to secure low-interest home improvement loans for Broadmoor 
residents (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2019). 
Today, the BIA serves as a hub of wellness for the neighborhood. It offers food 
pantry assistance, counseling services, educational opportunities, and hosts events to 
bring community members closer together. It also serves as a conduit to the city 
government and advocates on behalf of the residents when seeking remedies to 
infrastructure repairs and addressing blighted homes. The BIA contributed greatly to the 
success of the repopulation and rebuilding of Broadmoor after Hurricane Katrina (The 
Broadmoor Project, 2007). 
Hurricane Katrina’s Impact on Broadmoor 
 
On the morning of Sunday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall 
just east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Katrina was downgraded from a Category 5 
hurricane to a Category 3 hurricane by the time it reached land; however, New Orleans 
and much of the Gulf Coast of the United States had been subjected to days of rain and 
wind as the storm tracked north over the area (WFAA, 2015). Prior to landfall, storm 
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Figure3: Hurricane Katrina Flood Depths in Broadmoor. Source: U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers 
experts predicted that Katrina would be a more intense storm than the city had previously 
experienced. As a precautionary measure, Mayor Ray Nagin ordered mandatory 
evacuations of the residents of New Orleans. He opened shelters in the Superdome, a 
sizeable covered football field and the nearby convention center as places of last resort 
(WFAA, 2015). Though estimates vary, there are reports of sustained winds of 95 mph 
and 8-10 inches of rain over 48 hours inundating New Orleans. As a result of the storm 
damage, pumping stations designed to remove floodwater from lower elevations of the 
city lost power (WFAA, 2015). They were unable to pump water into Lake Ponchartrain 
as designed, which increased residential flooding. Katrina's storm surge also raised water 
levels in Lake Ponchartrain, causing a breach of several of the protective levees. The 
breaches poured floodwater into the city, leaving approximately 80% of New Orleans 
underwater with depths ranging from 2-15 feet. The putrid water would take over two 
weeks to recede (WFAA, 2015). 
Broadmoor, like all areas of New Orleans, suffered immediate damage from the 
hurricane effects of the storm. It would be the failure of the levees; however, that was the 
most significant contributor to the damage and extended displacement (The Broadmoor 
Project, 2007). The average flood 
level in Broadmoor was 5.08 feet, 
whereas, in affected areas, the 
average flood level was 4.43 feet 
(Figure 3). Further observation 
shows that Broadmoor's blocks 
sustained on average between 2.9 
and 6.52 feet of water, whereas in 
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affected areas, the spread ranged from 2 to 9.59 feet (The Broadmoor Project, 2007). In 
Broadmoor, 100 percent of the housing units had sustained major or severe damage; 90 
percent would require major remediation and repair to be inhabitable again (Scott, Fung, 
2008). 
Rebuilding Plan and the Green Dot Map 
 
Almost immediately after the storm, the top-down process began with actions by 
city leaders to quickly craft a rebuilding plan and gain federal implementation funding. 
This process soon became engulfed in conflicts, mistrust, policies, and bureaucratic rules 
and processes that slowed the creation of a formal recovery plan as well as the flow of 
rebuilding funds (Sideman, 2013). It 
was around and in response to, this 
top-down system that the grassroots 
neighborhood rebuilding efforts by 
New Orleans' citizens took shape 
(Sideman, 2013). On September 30, 
Mayor Nagin formally announced the 
formation of the 17-member Bring 
New Orleans Back (BNOB) 
Commission and charged it with 
creating a rebuilding plan for the city. 
Earlier in September, the City Council 
had announced its intention to appoint 
an Advisory Committee on Hurricane 
Recovery, but this committee was 
Figure 4: Green Dot Map Source: New Orleans Times-Picayune 
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short-lived and never developed any proposals (Lamb, 2019). 
 
The December 2005 release of the infamous green dot map (Figure 4) by then- 
mayor Ray Nagin's Bring Back New Orleans Commission was unveiled (Lamb, 2019). 
That map charted a plan to shrink the city's footprint by tightening redevelopment and 
turning some heavily inundated areas into park space—Broadmoor included. It was as if 
the city was attempting to "disappear" (Bliss & Bliss, 2015, para.34) certain 
neighborhoods. 
A moratorium on building permits in heavily flooded/damaged areas was 
recommended. Those sections of the city that contained deeply flooded and heavily 
damaged properties were designated as special neighborhood planning areas, which 
would have to prove their viability to rebuild (Lamb, 2019). The chief yardstick of that 
viability would be whether over 50 percent of their pre‐Katrina population would commit 
to returning (Fung, 2008). The building permit moratorium and other proposals, 
explained by the BNOB Urban Planning Committee, were intended to protect 
homeowners from prematurely investing in renovations (Fung, 2008). The plan also 
envisioned massive buyouts of damaged residential property, according to The Times‐ 
Picayune, which would allow for the possibility of significantly expanding the city's open 
space. It further suggested six residential areas - indicated by the green dots - that could 
accommodate large parks, depending on whether those areas fail to recover fully. One of 
the drivers behind this effort was to mitigate against future flooding. The vast amount of 
impervious surfaces in the city contribute to flooding, and increasing the number of 
pervious surfaces, including greenspaces, would assist water drainage. Finally, the 
committee report called for all 73 neighborhoods in the city-organized into 13 
neighborhood planning districts and led by teams of residents, urban planners, historic 
 preservationists, and others to participate in the process of mapping out their vision of the 
future. It set a tight four-month timetable for the planning teams (Lamb, 2019). If Mayor 
Nagin were to sign off on the recommendations on January 20 -the day, the last of the 
BNOB committee reports was due - it would automatically set the clock ticking, The 
Times‐Picayune reported, meaning that the day of reckoning for moribund 
neighborhoods would be May 20, 2006. Property acquisition in buyout areas, according 
to the paper, could begin on August 12. The buyouts would not be voluntary (Fung, 
2008). 
At the time of the BNOB proposal, many residents of Broadmoor had already 
begun the rebuilding process. Learning that there was a halt on building permits and that 
their homes might be taken to become greenspace threatened the cohesion of the 
neighborhood. As its details emerged, the plan elicited expressions of consternation and, 
increasingly, outrage among residents of New Orleans's flooded neighborhoods (Fung, 
2008). The strongest reaction came from those who lived under what one columnist 
called the curse of the green dot (Fung, 2008). Some residents suspected that the green 
dots represented a covert land grab by real estate developers. They also perceived 
unfairness in the green dot designation, noting that Lakeview-a wealthy and mostly white 
neighborhood near Lake Pontchartrain had sustained more severe flood damage than 
Broadmoor, but were not placed under a green dot. This confirmed deep suspicions, 
…that politics were at play (Fung, 2008). 
 
Broadmoor Lives 
 
In the early months of 2006, and now galvanized against the threat of the Green 
Dot, Broadmoor residents commenced work on a redevelopment plan under the auspices 
of the Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) (Belfer Center, 2016). This plan 
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Figure 5: Broadmoor Lives. Source: Broadmoor Improvement 
Association 
would map out the neighborhood's recovery from the devastating effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. Residents used the BIA as a conduit to communicate the status of rebuilding 
efforts in the neighborhood. A marketing executive who lived in the neighborhood 
created the Broadmoor Lives 
slogan to illustrate that the 
neighborhood was actively 
rebuilding (Belfer Center, 2016). 
Residents who were actively 
rebuilding or who intended to 
rebuild were asked to place lawn 
signs (Figure 5) with the slogan on their property to message to anyone driving by that 
even among the destruction and debris Broadmoor Lives - now (Belfer Center, 2016). 
Financial and technical assistance toward the New Orleans rebuilding effort was 
received from many different sources. The Green Dot map caught the attention of the 
Clinton Global Initiative. They provided $5 million toward the Broadmoor rebuilding 
effort. Harvard's Kennedy School of Government received funding from Shell Oil for a 
three-year grant to support the redevelopment of Broadmoor, including, among other 
things, additional student internships, executive training programs for neighborhood 
leaders, and neighborhood forums in Broadmoor (Fung, 2008) 
In March 2006, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which 
was expected to pay for the BNOB planning teams, withdrew its offer of funding. With 
that, the BNOB initiative and the green dot buyouts effectively ended, though no official 
pronouncement was made. With no other plan to take the place of the moribund BNOB, 
the future of the city's severely damaged neighborhoods appeared to be in limbo. Mayor 
24 
 Nagin, who was running for re‐election in May, assiduously sidestepped the question of 
which neighborhoods would receive city services proclaiming that the market would 
decide (Fung, 2008). 
With the green dot map threat removed, Broadmoor residents believed that 
rebuilding would be easier thanks to funding from the government through FEMA 
funding. When residents were disabused of that notion, they were at a loss (Scott, Fung, 
2008). Eventually, residents were persuaded that their vision of federal aid would not 
materialize, nor could they expect much help from the city or state government, which 
had yet to formulate their recovery plans for New Orleans. Once convinced, Broadmoor 
faced the next logical conclusion that they would have to handle their implementation. 
Residents would have not only to scale their plan to realistically doable things but then 
also figure out the mechanisms by which they were going to accomplish the 
implementation (Fung, 2008). 
 
 
The Broadmoor Redevelopment Plan 
 
"We hold the Broadmoor planning process up as a model for post-disaster 
reconstruction planning. And we also hold the process up as a model for any community- 
based planning effort. The truly unique thing about the Broadmoor plan is that it was 
created almost entirely by the residents themselves, and yet achieves a level 
commensurate with professional planning standards." - Douglas Ahlers, Senior Fellow & 
Principal Investigator Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Broadmoor 
Improvement Association, 2006, p. 6) 
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans had an emergency 
management plan to address risk from hurricanes and flooding; however, it did not have 
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a master plan. The city did have a comprehensive zoning ordinance, but it was subject to 
political influence and lacked strong enforcement (Weil, 2010). Developers seeking 
variances often sought out city councilors directly instead of using the formal process. 
This abuse contributed to a lack of predictability concerning land use (Collins, 2015). 
The city also had a history of weak citizen engagement, which is a function of both the 
city not having a formal process to engage citizens and a culture of disengagement or 
laissez-faire attitude that tended to permeate all aspects of social life in New Orleans 
(Weil, 2010). 
Using the already defined neighborhood subgroup structure, the BIA established 
various committees to develop rebuilding plans and communicate outcomes to returning 
residents (Sideman, 2013). This effort became publicly known and caught the attention 
of a fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Neighborhood Empowerment Initiative, a 
research project conducted by a team of faculty, students, and staff. A team from Harvard 
traveled to Broadmoor to aid in the rebuilding effort. Even after the effort to buy back 
properties failed due to lack of funding, and Broadmoor was no longer under direct threat 
turning into green space, the Kennedy School continued to provide technical assistance 
with the creation of the Broadmoor Redevelopment Plan (Clement et al., 2016). They 
observed and documented the process by which the residents of the Broadmoor 
neighborhood of New Orleans organized and followed a structured planning process that 
resulted in the creation of this redevelopment plan, which was published in July of 2006, 
almost one year after the storm (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). 
The research conducted into Broadmoor's rebuilding supports that some of the 
benchmarks of the rebuilding plan were reached, or are still in process; however, a 
comprehensive analysis of benchmark achievement was not conducted. Emergency 
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management and land use planning practitioners are encouraged to consider the 
redevelopment plan through the lenses of the development process, structure, and 
participatory nature of this specific plan. Emphasis should be given to how these 
processes can be incorporated into emergency management, hazard mitigation, and 
master plans. The Broadmoor plan was developed to assist a small community of only a 
couple thousand people located in a major U.S. city, and the process should be evaluated 
for areas of overlap between emergency management and master planning and the 
potential to scale to larger communities. The Broadmoor Redevelopment Plan was a 
community effort lead by the BIA. They also worked with a senior fellow, three 
university staff members, and 22 students from Harvard Kennedy School (Clement et al., 
2016). The Harvard group was instrumental in helping the residents develop their plan 
and set realistic goals. For example, they warned the community not to rely heavily on 
federal funds, which might not materialize (Fung, 2008). Instead, they needed to rely on 
their skills and take the initiative to secure external funding. The community created 
fund-raising efforts through a partnership with outside organizations, including corporate 
sponsors such as Shell Oil, General Motors, and Travelocity, among others (Broadmoor 
Improvement Association, 2007). Partnerships were established with universities (MIT, 
Harvard, Bard College), and faith-based groups within the city. Grant funding and 
private foundation assistance were received through several sources, including the 
Carnegie Corporation, YMCE, and Deutsche Bank (Broadmoor Improvement 
Association, 2007). The community members, along with the BIA, and the Harvard 
group met and discussed segments of the redevelopment plan. They came up with ideas, 
and they discussed and agreed on ways they would resolve conflicts, including 
differences in development goals and priorities. Subcommittees held weekly meetings 
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that focused on specific goals and then presented their ideas at community-wide meetings 
(Fung, 2008). 
The Intersection of Land Use Planning and Emergency Management 
 
The Broadmoor Rebuilding Plan identified several benchmarks that served to 
provide direction for the rebuilding efforts and contribute to the mitigation against future 
disruption from flooding or other quality of life concerns. The plan was like a 
comprehensive land-use plan, providing a direction that the community was seeking to 
build and improve quality of life while mitigating against future occurrences of flooding. 
Certain benchmarks from the plan have been analyzed and compared with emergency 
management theory to provide examples of collaboration between the two planning 
processes and the resulting increased capacity for the community to prepare for future 
disruption, absorb the impact of the disruption and recovery more efficiently than before 
Hurricane Katrina. 
One of the identified benchmarks of the redevelopment plan was to support 
continued flood mitigation through ongoing efforts with local, state, and federal 
assistance agencies (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). This action item was 
an opportunity to partner with emergency management planners to learn more about the 
planning efforts of local, state, and federal stakeholders. Successfully collaborating with 
community leaders to solve problems builds relationships and trust over time. As trust is 
built, community leaders can provide insight into the needs and capabilities of a 
community and help to ramp up interest about emergency management programs that 
support resiliency (FEMA, 2011). Currently, the city of New Orleans provides a rich 
online resource to educate and provide resources to residents, including a function that 
estimates flood risk by specific address (City of New Orleans, 2020). The Broadmoor 
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Rebuilding plan identified for and provided resources for residents to enable them to take 
care of their own needs as much as possible. Information was provided to residents so 
they could create go-kits and home kits before an emergency. These kits contain 
necessary legal documents (insurance policies, account numbers, deeds) and necessary 
emergency supplies (cash, prescriptions, clothing) so residents could evacuate to safety 
and retain important legal and personal items (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 
2006). Pre-hurricane season planning is offered, and community response events are 
utilized to continue education and preparedness activities. 
The plan also proposed a package of zoning changes, including an overlay 
district. The overlay district intended to preserve one of Broadmoor's most valuable 
assets, its historic character. However, two of the provisions within the overlay district 
proposal also served to assist in flooding mitigation. The first mitigation-related proposal 
was the establishment of a tree preservation district within Broadmoor patterned on the 
Metairie Ridge Tree Preservation District (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). 
The district ensured that viable trees were not lost during new construction. In addition to 
adding to the aesthetics of the neighborhood and acting as windbreaks, trees also provide 
water uptake during rainstorms. The more trees that remained in the neighborhood, the 
less stormwater went into the drainage system. The second mitigation-related proposal 
was the limitation of pavement within residential lots. Again, while ensuring a more 
beautiful neighborhood, such a measure also allowed rainwater to be absorbed into the 
soil, rather than running off into the streets and then through the drainage system to Lake 
Pontchartrain (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). A stormwater management 
plan identifies the contribution that stormwater infrastructure makes to a flood hazard 
and identifies policies or improvements that can be made to mitigate the hazard (FEMA, 
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2013). Localized flooding may be created or exacerbated by channeling stormwater 
runoff. Implementing low-impact development stormwater management techniques may 
be proposed as a way to mitigate this impact. Open space is often an appropriate use of 
hazard areas and can be used to buffer developed areas from hazards (FEMA, 2013). 
The Improvement Plan provided an opportunity for partnerships with a local 
university and faith-based groups to redevelop the industrial area at the north tip of the 
Broadmoor neighborhood and increase commercial and residential opportunities for 
residents (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). By matching existing 
capabilities to needs and working to strengthen these resources, communities can 
improve their disaster resiliency (FEMA, 2011). Community leaders and partners can 
help emergency managers in identifying the changing needs and capabilities that exist in 
the community. 
The Improvement Plan sought to redevelop commercial areas by working with 
merchants, commercial property owners, and commercial developers to redevelop certain 
areas of Broadmoor (Broadmoor Improvement Association, 2006). In this type of 
functional plan, methods and goals to guide private investment to areas that are less 
vulnerable to known hazards encourage mutual public and private objectives focused on 
protecting, sustaining, and enhancing the community's economic base (FEMA, 2013). 
Such opportunities may also include structural or other protective measures of 
commercial areas, business continuity planning, or activities that promote a diverse 
economic base that is not overly reliant on businesses or industries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the impacts of disasters. Economic development plans can also highlight 
the rationale for infrastructure projects that prevent impacts or disruption to the business 
community and support long-term economic stability (FEMA, 2013). 
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The Broadmoor Improvement plan created needed relationships and partnerships 
at the time that it was rebuilding the community. This was effective but it was not ideal. 
Relationships and partnerships should be identified, established, and cultivated during 
times of non-emergency (FEMA, 2011). The BIA did create a relationship with the city 
of New Orleans to address specific community concerns, but it was not until 2010 that 
the city of New Orleans integrated the master plan with a emergency management plan 
(FEMA, 2013) . The New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
(CEMP) is also referenced within the 2010 Hazard Mitigation Plan Update. The CEMP is 
described as the primary resource for emergency operations, whereas the Hazard 
Mitigation Plan Update is aimed at reducing the community's vulnerability to disasters 
and emergencies (FEMA, 2013). Plan integration helps clarify the difference between the 
CEMP and the hazard mitigation plan. "Successful integration of hazard mitigation 
efforts has led to six out of every ten residents in New Orleans reporting that they have 
seen progress to stormwater protection in their city, a common subject matter in many 
planning mechanisms" (FEMA, 2013, p.5-5). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
New Orleans was settled 300 years ago, and it was not unlike other developing 
cities. Desires to create livable spaces to suit human needs or economic development are 
at times in conflict with environmental restrictions. Human innovation provides 
mechanisms to overcome natural obstacles, and development continues. Planners and 
city officials in New Orleans were successful in removing floodwater, swamp, and 
marshland from the city, allowing that space to dry and continue the built environment. 
Doing so has created another environmental challenge, which is the subsidence of those 
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drained landmasses. Settling of the earth is creating areas of the city that are below sea 
level and more prone to flooding. The unprecedented damage by Hurricane Katrina and 
the subsequent failure of water control safeguards like the pumping system and levees 
demonstrated how vulnerable to flooding certain areas of the city remain. In the wake of 
the storm, the city instituted plans to rebuild, and to reduce future flooding in these areas, 
challenging the identified neighborhoods to demonstrate viability, the return of residents, 
very quickly. The failure to return to a pre-storm population percentage would result in 
forced buyouts of property, and the neighborhood would be taken by the government, 
converting it to greenspace. From a planning perspective, takings may have been the 
most appropriate course of action to reduce the likelihood of future flooding and 
potential loss of life and property. The Green Dot plan failed as a result of perceived 
racial disparity, political corruption, and ultimately lack of funding. In the absence of a 
rebuilding plan from the city, the Broadmoor Improvement Association created its plan 
to rebuild the neighborhood and encourage residents to return. This process of 
developing and implementing the plan was centered around the community input and 
strengthened through key partnerships with corporate, philanthropic, and community 
resources. The plan incorporated strategies of land use and hazard mitigation plans to be 
thoughtful of the relationship between redevelopment and hazard mitigation. The 
Broadmoor plan illustrates how establishing working relationships and integrating land 
use and emergency management theory, and practice can result in a planning process that 
increases community capacity and resilience. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PLACE ATTACHMENT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 
 
“While lives families can be restarted in many locations, a city and its culture are 
necessarily tied to a place” (Sideman, 2013, 6). 
 
 
Before discussing the relationship among emergency managers, planners, and the 
public, it is helpful to provide a context for the discussion. Emergency managers and 
planners provide services to the community as a whole and its public or residents as 
individuals. These services represent the governing body, such as the local state or 
federal government. It may be difficult for the public to contextualize the need for these 
services as they often provide for, or protect from, something that has not yet happened. 
For example, emergency managers may prepare plans for evacuations of the community 
if there is a need, which may or may not be likely. 
Similarly, planners may provide for zoning or code guidance to ensure the safety 
of land or building uses to protect citizens from an event that may or may not occur. Both 
practitioners develop plans to increase mitigation of damage, prevent loss of life, and 
reduce property damage from many different sources. Often the risk or vulnerability is 
not immediate, which may lead to disagreement or discourse on the part of the public as 
to the importance of such guidance or restriction. 
The public's ability to own land, own a home (residence) or rent a home in which 
they have legal and social right to also influences how they may respond to changes in 
their built environment. Thus, through the common law, state law, and the Constitution, 
property rights—the rights of people to freely acquire, use, and dispose of property are 
provided certain protections. Often a 'home' is associated with a physical structure inside 
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which an individual or family lives. The theoretical concept of 'home" is much more 
powerful. Planners and emergency managers must understand the role that the concept of 
home plays during times of disaster or sudden shock because it is often a powerful 
influence on human behavior. 
 
 
Home as a Place 
 
Easthope (2004, 135) stated, "Homes can be understood as places that hold 
considerable social, psychological, and emotive meaning for individuals and groups.", 
and "Home can be directly experienced." It is this experience that gives 'home' its power 
to elicit a strong emotional response from people. In this context, 'home' is what has not 
moved. For those who are absent from it, 'home' becomes defined as something that must 
be returned to, a place of both familiarity and safety.  (Morrice, 2013) 
Home is a place. It is not just a structure; it is the location of the structure, the 
physical property, the location of the property within the broader community, the 
community itself, and the location of the community within the larger geographical areas 
such as the state or even country. Not only is home identified by physical or geographical 
boundaries, but it is also defined perhaps more importantly, by the social connection, 
feelings, and emotions that it provides to the individual people. There may be many 
factors that connect or attach people to a place. 
 
 
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs as it Relates to Housing 
 
Some of the attachment to place that people experience may be explained in part 
through the fulfillment of needs as described by Maslow (Urbaneer, 2017), (Figure 6). 
The home as a structure may provide for basic physiological needs such as 
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Figure 6: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Source: www.simplepsychology.com 
shelter, sleep, and food. 
The home as a structure 
and perhaps extending out 
to aspects of the 
community may provide 
for safety and security 
needs. For example, the 
home itself is keeping 
people safe, and perhaps 
it is located on a safe street or in a safe neighborhood. Individuals spend hours in their 
homes, often with loved ones, which creates strong emotional bonds. When family 
members and community members learn to work together toward a common goal, their 
acceptance of each other increases. Acceptance creates a sense of love and belonging 
(Urbaneer, 2017). Houses and neighborhoods can be unique and provide recognition for 
an individual or as a smaller community within a broader community (Urbaneer, 2017), 
i.e., Brooklyn is identified separately from Staten Island or New York City. 
Often living in specific locations is not by choice; it is by necessity, and there 
may be factors that contribute to the ability or inability of one to move to another home. 
Socio-economic status, specifically poverty has been linked to housing location and 
influences the available resources for persons in those locations (Joseph Roundtree 
Foundation 2017). 
 
 
Place Making 
 
What creates the attachment that people have to places? In “What Makes a 
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Successful Place?”, The Project for Public Places (2020), states that four key attributes 
can influence place. 
1. Uses and Activities 
 
2. Comfort and Image 
 
3. Access and Linkages 
 
4. Sociability 
 
These key attributes may be fulfilled through various "intangibles," which may be 
experienced by the user of the place at an individual level or associated with a place 
through a more extensive social network (The Project for Public Spaces, 2020). Users of 
a space may question or seek to evaluate how the place demonstrates the key attributes in 
a way that affects their desired outcome of experiencing the space. The decision to reside 
in a certain neighborhood for example may be influenced by the availability of access to 
needed resources, the level of volunteerism or formal and informal social networks such 
as neighborhood associations that the place demonstrates, or the environmental uses of 
the space (The Project for Public Spaces, 2020). 
 
 
Place Identity, Attachment and Disaster Response 
 
Place identity is substructure of social identity, like gender and social class 
(Qazimi, 2014). The identity with a place may consist of memories, values, thoughts, 
ideas, and settings and may also include the relationship between different settings such 
as home, neighborhood and school (Qazimi, 2014). As described above, places may 
create attachments between and individual and the physical environment. This 
attachment may manifest itself through the association one has with their home, their 
neighborhood or the region as people see themselves as distinct from, but related to, the 
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physical environment (Qazimi, 2014). A relationship may form between people sharing 
the same place and this relationship may create social networks which in turn may 
strengthen the attachment to a place and contribute to establishing social capital. 
According to Agrawal and Monroe (2006:163), 
 
“social capital is both an economic and non-economic benefit that individuals, groups, 
and communities get through the structure of their relationships. It is referred to as 
“social” because it grows out of relationships between people. It is a form of “capital” 
in that it helps individuals achieve things that they might not have been able to achieve 
otherwise.” 
Social participation in local community, neighborhood connections, family/friends and 
work connections can lead to the building of social capacity, which refers to the 
necessary steps and conditions in which social capital will flourish, which include 
feelings of trust and safety, acceptance of diversity, appreciation of life, and being 
proactive in a social context (Onyx & Bullen, 2000). 
Place attachment and social capacity work together, so that higher social capacity 
often leads to robust places which lead to stronger place attachment subsequently 
encouraging stronger social capacity, and so on (Bihari & Ryan, 2012). Increased social 
capital may facilitate more preparedness actions and mitigation measures at the 
community level, which supports the findings of previous research that suggests that 
residents of communities with higher social capital will be more willing to collaborate on 
solving common problems (Agrawal & Monroe, 2006). Place attachment impacts 
people's actions in times of disaster. The results indicate that past experience with 
wildfires and stronger place attachment significantly influence social capital and thereby 
preparedness in at-risk communities (Bihari & Ryan, 2012). 
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When Hurricane Katrina bore down on New Orleans, the storm threatened not 
only individual possessions but also homes, lifestyles, and social networks. The way in 
which evacuees accommodate this stress is an essential determinant in their return 
decisions (Morrice, 2013). The scale of physical and economic losses faced by the city 
and its residents presented the greatest trial for New Orleans. It raised confounding 
questions about if and how New Orleans could be rebuilt. While lives and families can be 
restarted in many locations, a city and its culture are necessarily tied to a place (Sideman, 
2013). 
Why Return After a Disaster? 
 
Rebuilding after a disaster consists of repopulation, which is the return of people 
to live in the affected area but rebuilding also constitutes the re-establishing of social 
connections in the community. Although rebuilding a neighborhood and city depends on 
individual decisions, it is also a community project. It requires that many people, 
households, and businesses decide to return. These decisions are influenced by the 
actions of neighbors and the aid and support provided on the ground to overcome the 
many obstacles to returning (Sideman, 2013). For residents of New Orleans who were 
displaced by Hurricane Katrina, numerous obstacles stood in the way of returning to the 
city and rebuilding. The scope of the damage required the city limits to be closed in order 
to keep people safe and it took a substantial amount of time for flood waters to recede. 
The storms impact on the economy, primarily tourism resulted in fewer available jobs for 
many residents who work in the tourism and service industries (Sideman, 2013). 
Although socioeconomic factors often play a role in deciding to return, emotional issues 
also play a significant role in the making of this decision. There may be a "nostalgic 
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connection" as feelings of safety and familiarity with the devastated area. This 
connection offers a strong incentive for people to return to their homes after a disaster 
(Jamali & Nejat, 2016). 
In her article Heartache and Hurricane Katrina: Recognizing the Influence of 
Emotion in Post-Disaster Return Decisions, Stephanie Morrice says, 
"New Orleanians hold a powerful and emotional attachment to their city. Many 
residents spoke at length about the affinity to the city. This romanticized culture 
creates a strong sense of nostalgia among those who are forcibly separated from the 
city. This, in turn, influences their desire to return and succeeding return decisions." 
(Morrice, 2013). 
Morrice also captured the following responses from two residents who were 
forced to evacuate New Orleans. The responses illustrate the powerful connection to 
home and place. 
Lucy: "New Orleans is always going to be home. I know some people who think that 
it's weird to call New Orleans home because so much has changed. The first time I 
went back it was – like stepping into the Twilight Zone, you know. And it was just 
heartbreaking to see. But I grew up in the city, that's where my parents grew up and 
that's where their parents grew up. It's always been home – and always will be. There's 
just something about the city, it's so familiar, even though it's been really beaten up, 
it's just where I feel like I belong. One of the hardest things for me to deal with now is 
being away from home. This [Houston] isn't home, it's just a place I was forced to 
come to." 
Bernice: "There's no place like New Orleans, no people like New Orleans and you 
really have to be a part of that community to really understand what we're saying . . . 
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Before I came home, I thought about what it would be like to go back. Seeing my 
house for the first time after Katrina just filled me with emotion. I remember feeling 
instantly comforted by familiarity." 
Lucy's account explores the emotional power of place attachment in the post-disaster 
landscape. The nostalgia she feels towards 'home' is a primary influence in her desire to 
return to New Orleans. Lucy's situation represents one of continued displacement; as she 
remains in a city she does not feel a connection to. Her emotions, then, intersect with 
other return variables, such as financial stability, that likewise play a role in the decision 
process, limiting her capacity to return (Morrice, 2013). 
Understanding this dialectic between place and 'home' helps to identify how an 
evacuee's sense of belonging is grounded, understood, and negotiated in a site of 
displacement. For evacuees like Bernice, New Orleans represents a landscape of 
familiarity and safety – a place where memories and connections create a nostalgic desire 
to return. By negotiating and overcoming the feelings of loss and uncertainty created by 
Katrina's destruction, an evacuee's return decision, and outcome, is driven by this 
nostalgia and perception of 'home' (Morrice, 2013). The impact of a disaster or sudden 
shock is not limited to only those who were forced to evacuate. In cases of sudden shock, 
there may be no evacuation necessary, yet the community sense of place suffers an 
impact. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There may be many factors that connect or attach people to a place and people 
may experience attachments to places for a variety of reasons. A home is a place, and an 
individual's attachment to place is an essential factor to understand when planning for 
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disaster response and recovery. A planner or emergency manager may ask: What defines 
the community, and how can one learn more about why people are living there? Often 
living in specific locations is not by choice; it is by necessity, and there may be factors 
that contribute to the ability or inability of one to move to another home or community. 
It is important to remember that places meet human needs. What are the key 
attributes in the community that contribute to meeting the community needs? What are 
the strengths to build on, and where are the gaps? How is social capital cultivated? Place 
attachment impacts people's actions in times of crisis. Place attachment may impact their 
ability to prepare for and respond to a and it can impact their ability to return, repopulate, 
and rebuild. Repopulation includes the re-establishing of social networks and requires 
that many people, households, and businesses decide to return, and these decisions are 
influenced by the actions of neighbors and the aid and support provided on the ground to 
overcome the many obstacles to return. A place may create memories and connections 
and a nostalgic desire to return. When place is threatened or damaged, the community 
often feels the emotional impact even if physical damage is isolated. There is a deep 
emotional bond between the sites of survivors and sites of tragedy (Tumarkin & OReilly, 
2006). It is this emotional bond that can drive the displaced back to these localities. 
(Morrice, 2013) This deep emotional experience, especially when shared with others in 
the community, may influence an evacuees' capacity to return to the community. 
Different return outcomes also remind us that each evacuee negotiates the emotions 
within the post-disaster migration experience in a different way. (Morrice, 2013) 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND ROLE OF THE LAND USE PLANNER 
 
Contemporary emergency management in the United States traces its roots to 
the Cold War era of the 1950s (FEMA, 2004). As the nation prepared for nuclear 
attack, almost every American community maintained a civil defense director, and 
most States had an official who represented civil defense in the State government 
hierarchy (FEMA, 2004). By profession, these individuals were primarily retired 
military personnel, and their operations received little political or financial support 
from their state or local governments (FEMA, 2004). Through the 1960s and 1970s, as 
communities across the U.S. managed severe storms and other disasters, there was a 
minimal coordinated effort between local, state, and federal governments. In 1978 
President Carter created Reorganization Plan Number 3 (3 CFR 1978, 5 U.S. Code 
903). The stated and achieved intent of this plan was to consolidate emergency 
preparedness, mitigation, and response activities into one federal emergency 
management organization (FEMA, 2004). The President proclaimed that the plan 
would provide for the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and that the FEMA Director would report directly to the President (FEMA, 
2004). As a fledgling federal agency, FEMA became mired in bureaucracy and 
received criticism for being slow to respond to various disasters during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (FEMA, 2004). 
In the early to mid-1990s, President Clinton appointed a new FEMA director 
who had emergency management experience. Under new leadership, FEMA returned 
to partnering with communities to identify risks and develop response plans under an 
"All Hazards Approach" (FEMA, 2004). This approach encouraged collaborative 
 mitigation and response planning for a variety of disruptions and began to standardize 
how communities could respond more effectively (FEMA, 2004). After the September 
11, 2001 terror attacks, President Bush consolidated FEMA and several other agencies 
under the newly created Department of Homeland Security, broadening FEMA's 
responsibility to include response to terror attacks. Since 2001, several Presidential 
policy declarations provided additional structure to FEMA's management of disasters, 
which is governed by the National Preparedness Goal, National Response Framework, 
and the National Incident Management System (FEMA, 2010). 
FEMA describes four 
phases of emergency response: 
Mitigation, Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery 
(FEMA, 2004). These phases 
are often presented visually 
through a cyclical diagram and 
generally begin at the 
mitigation phase. Figure (7) 
illustrates one version of this 
diagram and aids the reader in 
better understanding the phases in relation to when a disaster strikes. 
 
Local Level Structure 
 
At the local or state level, an Emergency Manager or Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) may be established to address the planning for and response to 
disasters or sudden shocks. Historically, OEM and the emergency planning process 
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Figure 7- Emergency Management Cycles. Source: Fairfax County VA 
 have been the responsibility of people with experience as traditional first responders 
because they are often responsible for managing the sites of disasters (FEMA, 2013). 
The OEM is also responsible for conducting hazard vulnerability assessments to 
prioritize the known or suspected risks facing the community and is often charged with 
developing plans to address the risk at each stage of the four-step process (FEMA, 
2004). 
FEMA's Academic Emergency Management and Related Courses (AEMRC) 
for the Higher Education Program-Emergency and Risk Management Case Studies 
Textbook (2004) defines and describes each phase of emergency management. In 
order to incorporate these concepts into comprehensive plans, planners should be 
aware of and understand this process. Specific to each phase below, the synthesis of 
planning knowledge, skills, abilities, or theory is provided to clarify the cooperation 
between master planning and emergency planning. 
Mitigation: Before the Disaster 
 
Mitigation is defined as a sustained action to reduce or eliminate risk to people 
and property from hazards and their effects (FEMA, 2004). The function of mitigation 
differs from the other emergency management disciplines in that it looks at long-term 
solutions to reducing risk as opposed to merely accepting that they will happen and 
preparing for their consequences, responding to their consequences, or recovering 
from them. Except for the fire service community who lead early in the effort to 
mitigate fire risks through their support for building codes, code enforcement, and 
public education, the emergency management community has remained focused on 
response and recovery obligations (FEMA, 2013). Changes in leadership at the Federal 
level and more significant disasters have created substantial increases in funding, and 
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 more value and professionalism in emergency management, have resulted in greater 
acknowledgment of the importance of mitigation (FEMA, 2004). 
According to FEMA, 
 
"Implementing mitigation programs and activities requires the participation and 
support of a broad spectrum of players outside of the traditional emergency 
management circle. Mitigation involves, among other public and private sector 
participants, land-use planners, construction and building officials, business 
owners, insurance companies, community leaders, and politicians" (FEMA, 2004). 
However, planners are not included in the language of the other phases and arguably 
should have a role in each phase of the emergency management process. 
Planners are also uniquely qualified because the comprehensive/master 
planning process utilizes the same skills needed to accomplish mitigation- planning 
expertise, political acumen, marketing, and public relations and consensus building, 
among others. These skills are different from the operational, first responder skills, 
which more traditionally characterize emergency management professionals. 
Historically, the emergency management professional has been reluctant to take a lead 
role in promoting mitigation because it appears to fall outside of this scope of 
activities (FEMA, 2004). This siloed mentality ultimately limits the effectiveness of 
the emergency manager and their planning process. 
Preparedness: Before the Disaster 
 
Preparedness within the field of emergency management can best be defined as 
a state of readiness to respond to a disaster, crisis, or any other type of emergency 
(FEMA, 2020). Often, preparedness consists of taking actions ahead of time to be 
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 ready for the emergency. These actions may be educational and practical. The simple 
act of exposing students to a fire drill is preparing them to respond in a specific way 
should an actual fire take place. Community preparation is not as easy, and community 
members must receive education regarding risks that may present to them. Emergency 
managers must address and overcome the community's denial of danger as well. In 
areas prone to recurring natural events, there may be public sentiment to stay in place 
as the storm passes because it is more convenient than evacuating. Preparedness can 
never be truly complete. The adage among emergency management professions states, 
"the earthquake you prepare for might not be the earthquake that you get." Each 
disaster or sudden shock has unique nuances that may or may not fit neatly into 
preparedness activities. 
The process planners use when conducting charrettes is very similar to the 
process of preparing for a disaster. In a charrette, a designated team organizes and runs 
the process, which typically includes the project sponsor (e.g., the city planning 
agency, developer, or community group) and a multi-disciplinary team of 
professionals. This group is usually staffed, at a minimum, with planners, architects, 
landscape architects, transportation engineers, and economists. Consultants or agency 
staff may augment this team. Emergency management planning and preparation use a 
very similar process and stakeholder participation. The involved stakeholders usually 
include OEM, first responders (fire/police), government representatives, community 
representatives, and at times outside consultants. Including community members, 
particularly those at higher risk of harm from disaster or sudden shock, is critical to 
developing an informed plan. 
In both processes, a multi-disciplinary team is essential to ensuring that the 
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 design work during each step of the process is realistic. Emergency plans need to 
account for what is likely to happen, not a conglomeration of calamities that are 
extremely unlikely to manifest. Every decision point must be fully informed to create a 
feasible plan in both disciplines. The focus on feasibility brings a level of seriousness 
and rigor to the process for everyone involved. 
Emergency management organizations cannot function without a strong 
preparedness capability. This capability is built through planning, training, and 
exercising, and has led to increased professionalism within the discipline of 
emergency management. All organizations in private, public, and government sectors 
are susceptible to the consequences of a disaster and must consider preparedness. 
Preparedness not only focuses on restoring essential government services, such as 
utilities and emergency services at pre-disaster levels but assisting businesses in 
quickly reopening to the public. Preparedness helps to minimize the required time for 
the affected population to return to pre-disaster life (FEMA, 2020). 
Response: During the Disaster 
 
When a disaster event such as a flood, earthquake, or hurricane occurs, the first 
responders to this event are local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel. Their 
job is to rescue and attend to those injured, suppress fires, secure the disaster area, and 
to begin the process of restoring order. They are supported in this effort by local 
emergency management personnel and community government officials (FEMA, 
2020). The efforts of first responders are coordinated through a process called the 
Incident Command System (ICS), which is a resource management structure designed 
to process situational awareness and resource allocation as needed (FEMA, 2020). ICS 
is modular and scalable based on the size of the incident. Because of this modular 
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design, planners can be incorporated into one or more of the pre-established function 
groups. ICS offers different functions which are tasked with achieving identified goals 
in the response phase. These functions are Operations, Planning, Logistics, and 
Finance (FEMA,2013). Planners may serve in any of these functions based on the 
current or future needs of the community response. 
It is important to note that in the mitigation and preparation phases, public 
participation is encouraged, even required, to build the best plans and ensure the most 
effective preparatory actions. These phases utilized a democratic decision process 
whereby all stakeholders are included in the decision making and development 
process. However, in order to ensure life safety and property preservation, the 
response phase requires a different decision-making process, one which is much more 
autocratic. During the response phase, clear direction from government officials to the 
community is essential to ensure personal safety. Response actions may include 
evacuation orders, restrictions on returning to affected areas, or curfews, and each 
action or direction helps to preserve life and property. Many community members may 
object to this approach; however, it is necessary. The understanding of this shift in the 
decision-making process allows planners to integrate contingencies into the master 
plan. For example, how will a long-term evacuation impact the economic viability of 
the community? If homes are flooded and not covered by insurance or slow to rebuild, 
how does blight affect the housing market and the return of residents? There is an 
infinite number of contingencies that can be considered and evaluated for inclusion in 
the master plan. 
Recovery: Before and After the Disaster 
 
There is often a theoretical debate over when the response function ends, and 
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the recovery function begins (FEMA, 2004). This thesis defines the response function 
as the immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. 
The recovery function is not so easily classified. Recovery typically begins in the first 
hours and days following a disaster event and can continue for months and, in some 
cases, years, depending on the severity of the event (FEMA,2004). Logically this 
makes sense, as there must be a disaster or event to recover from. However, recovery 
must be planned; local planners and emergency planners are encouraged to consider 
the community recovery goals during the mitigation and preparation phases of the 
planning processes. 
Unlike the response function, where all efforts have a singular focus, the 
recovery function or process is characterized by a complex set of issues and decisions 
that must be made by individuals and communities. These issues and decisions are 
more easily identified and addressed in the calm of a non-emergency period, and they 
serve to inform the mitigation and preparation phases. Recovery involves decisions 
and actions relative to rebuilding homes, replacing property, resuming employment, 
restoring businesses, and permanently repairing and rebuilding infrastructure. The 
recovery process requires balancing the more immediate need to return the community 
to normalcy with the longer-term goal of reducing future vulnerability (FEMA, 2020). 
The recovery process can provide individuals and communities with opportunities to 
become more economically secure and improve the overall safety and quality of life. 
Because the recovery function has such long-lasting impacts and (generally) 
high costs, the participants in the process vary. They include all levels of government, 
the business community, political leadership, community activists, and individuals. 
Each of these groups plays a role in determining how the recovery will progress. 
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Some of these roles are regulatory, such as the application of State or local building 
ordinances, and some, such as the insurance industry, provide financial support. The 
goal of recovery is to bring all the stakeholders together to plan, finance, and 
implement a recovery strategy that will rebuild the disaster impacted area to be safer 
and more secure as quickly as possible (FEMA, 2020). 
Planners are well suited to participate in the emergency management process, 
and many guiding FEMA documents and training programs promote the inclusion of 
planners to develop more effective emergency management plans and improve 
capacity at all four phases of the emergency management process (FEMA, 2013). 
Planning, Emergency Management, and Hazard Mitigation 
 
Planners are often responsible for the creation of the future vision of a 
community. This process usually involves community government, stakeholders, and 
other interested parties. Generally, master plans and comprehensive plans guide the 
following (Schwab, 2010): 
1. land use (both existing and future), 
 
2. demographics (existing and projected), 
 
3. housing, 
 
4. infrastructure, 
 
5. education, 
 
6. recreation, and 
 
7. transit 
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This list is not all-inclusive, and the individual community determines which 
elements contribute to the vision. Emergency management and hazard mitigation 
professionals also have an overarching planning process. Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plans (CEMP) focus on how the community will prepare and respond to 
a disaster. Still, those plans often do not include elements that are in a master plan, 
which may inform that process. Each plan needs the information, in part, from the 
other to become more inclusive and effective (FEMA, 2013). 
Emergency plans may consider pre-disaster mitigation efforts such as removal 
of underbrush in a fire-prone area, and plans may guide actions to recover from the 
disaster. Because emergency management has its origin in response to emergencies, 
many emergency plans historically focused on what actions are taken when the 
disaster strikes and the period between then and when the community is stabilized and 
rebuilding. Government entities are frequently responsible for initiating the evacuation 
of residents from communities that are under immediate threat. Some residents will 
self-evacuate seeking safer harbor during the event; however, local authorities often 
implement pre-established response plans to protect from loss of life and mitigate 
property damage. When the threat is no longer present or has sufficiently reduced, 
residents often return to their personal and community property to assess the damage. 
Under the Stafford Act, Federal and State governments can provide support and 
resources to local communities in times of disaster (FEMA, 2011). This support varies 
in size, scope, and duration based on the event and is often used in tandem with local 
government and community resources. In many instances, the rebuilding of the 
community continues long after the government support has left. Some communities 
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can support this process, but some communities may remain unable to rebuild. 
 
Planning for Disaster 
 
Emergency management plans and master plans should complement each other 
and coordinate how a community addresses the concerns of disasters and how the 
community responds should the disaster happen. Rebuilding a community after a 
disaster or sudden shock is also often discussed, and for many outside the affected 
community, rebuilding refers to the physical restoration of the damaged property. 
However, for affected communities, rebuilding is much more and must account for the 
psychological recovery of its residents who must adapt to a new normal. Rebuilding 
often takes years to complete, and most emergency management plans do not account 
for this long-term process. The master plan and the planner or planning department 
must be prepared to manage the recovery from the disaster long after the emergency 
plan has concluded. 
A community, regardless of size, may have a master plan guiding its 
development. The same community may also have an emergency management plan 
guiding its preparation and response to risks that threaten the community. Planners 
should not expect to be emergency management practitioners and be fluent in all 
aspects of the field. However, an understanding of the process of emergency 
management, hazard mitigation, resilience, and how emergency management plans are 
developed will provide a better understanding of how emergency management 
processes can be incorporated into master plans. 
What Role Should Planners Play? 
 
The field of emergency management and hazard mitigation has been growing 
53  
significantly since its inception in the 1950s. Emergency managers have become 
joined by other practitioners, such as civil engineers and others involved in planning 
for and developing public infrastructure. There are many people and institutions with 
stakes within the range of structural and nonstructural approaches to hazard mitigation. 
Nevertheless, planners' role in the process is central, and the process is less robust and 
less comprehensive without them (Schwab, 2010). The adoption of mitigation tools 
can strengthen the role of planning in both the short and long term. Planners must 
perceive the centrality of their role in this area and use their talents to the maximum 
benefit of public health and safety (Schwab, 2010). 
In 2010 the American Planning Association issued Planning Advisory Service 
Report Number 560 titled: Hazard Mitigation: Integrating Best Practices into 
Planning. The report details the importance of integrating emergency management, 
hazard mitigation, and planning to improve community resilience and capacity to 
prepare for a disaster or sudden shock (Schwab, 2010). 
"One of the primary goals of planning has always been the enhancement of quality 
of life in our communities. Most planners practice in the firm belief that their 
efforts are helping to improve the lives of people in the communities they serve. 
Nothing is more essential to protecting the quality of life than ensuring personal 
safety. All other benefits or public goods that people might regard as elements of a 
high-quality life—aesthetics, cultural activity, peaceable civic life, prosperity—are 
difficult or impossible to cultivate or enjoy when personal safety is in jeopardy" 
(Schwab, 2010, 1). 
Integrating hazards into the planning process on paper is easy, putting that 
 
integration into practice amid a myriad of local variables is much tougher. The 
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commitment and political will to address hazards wane when the immediate threat of, 
or response to, a disaster is gone. (Schwab, 2010). Planners can help temper this by 
initiating the public dialogue before disaster strikes, helping people to understand the 
urgency of the problem through effective public outreach and education. This entails 
involving as many key stakeholders as possible and helping them to achieve consensus 
on as many broad principles and action items as possible, given the prevailing norms 
of the community (Schwab, 2010). 
 
 
 
Comprehensive Vision and Goal Setting 
 
The ability to integrate hazard mitigation into the larger context of plan making 
in a community is tied directly to a unique and crucial planner's skill: the ability to 
think comprehensively about the challenges facing a community, how to address them 
with the resources available, and how to steer the public and its decision-makers 
toward goals and objectives that are reasonably constructed to achieve the desired ends 
(Schwab, 2010). Many other local government professionals are trained to manage 
particular and often isolated functions—civil engineering with sewer and water 
systems, for example, or police and fire officials with public safety—but few, except 
county, city, or town managers, are trained to think about the welfare of the 
community in its entirety with all. The complex relationships that exist among land 
use, economic development, population growth, the environment, and the physical 
impact of the built environment on any number of other factors are within the planners' 
scope. A planners' ability to think about the big, long-term thoughts about the 
interrelatedness and interdependency of all these factors makes them indispensable to 
hazard mitigation planning (Schwab, 2010). 
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Planners are often the one group of local government professionals who are 
specially trained to analyze spatial relationships. They plan for future growth and 
development and implement the resulting decisions. However, few planners receive 
formal training to understand how hazards should influence those tasks and processes. 
Hazard mitigation training in academic curriculums is sparse, though growing, and 
many planners have essentially learned on the job or through continuing education 
training. 
 
 
 
Integrating Hazards into Planning 
 
According to Godschalk (2010, 48), Integrating hazards into planning 
implementation tools has three primary goals: 
• Keeping future development out of known hazard areas. The purpose is to 
influence the location of public and private investment, guiding it away from known 
hazard areas and toward safe growth locations. For example, zoning and subdivision 
regulations can direct private development away from hazard areas through the 
designation of location-specific allowable land uses and standards for public safety. 
Capital improvement programs (CIPs) can direct funding for public facilities such as 
roads, bridges, utility systems, and critical facilities to locations outside hazard areas. 
• Keeping hazards from affecting existing developed areas. The purpose is to 
improve the protection of already built-up areas through structural mitigation projects 
or environmental management techniques that modify the progression of the hazard 
itself, using combinations of local funds from CIPs and funds from state and federal 
programs. For example, dams and levees can be constructed to provide a certain 
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amount of protection from future flooding for low-lying developed areas. At the same 
time, reforestation and wetland preservation can be used for flood control. 
• Strengthening existing development to resist hazards. The purpose is to 
enhance hazard resistance by enacting and enforcing construction code provisions 
concerning hazard stresses and impacts. For example, hazard area zones and 
subdivision regulations, as well as building codes, can contain design standards and 
project review procedures for ensuring the safety of projects subject to earthquake, 
landslide, wildfire, and flood hazards. 
A variety of tools and techniques can be used to link hazard mitigation 
planning and land use planning. Communities should establish complementary goals, 
policies, and recommendations in hazard mitigation plans and comprehensive plans 
(e.g., land use, natural resource protection/environmental management, transportation, 
public safety, etc.) It cannot be overstated that there is a distinct reliance between these 
planning processes and outcomes. Capital improvement plans (e.g., water/sewer line 
extension, construction of public facilities) and development regulations (e.g., zoning 
ordinance, subdivision regulations, building, and housing codes) should also 
incorporate hazard mitigation recommendations. Demographic data such as growth 
trends, land use patterns, critical infrastructure maps, and future land use maps should 
continue to be collected and shared with emergency management professionals to 
inform their planning process better. The sharing of information across planning 
disciplines and conducting proactive and coordinated outreach and stakeholder 
involvement in the planning processes helps to promote a strong culture of 
preparedness and mitigation. 
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The New Normal 
 
When considering the four phases of emergency management (mitigation, 
preparation, response, and recovery), some may think that once the danger has passed 
and the community has rebuilt, the application of the emergency plan would conclude. 
The cycle would then begin anew before the next disaster. Planners and emergency 
managers must incorporate awareness of the long-term effects of the disaster on the 
community into both emergency management and master plans. 
It seems intuitive that the goal of an impacted community after experiencing a 
disaster or sudden shock is to return to normal; or to those conditions which preceded 
the disaster. Recovery usually meant rebuilding the damaged structures, cleaning up 
the debris, and making necessary changes to avoid more damage should the next 
disaster befall the community. This approach makes sense for most people, especially 
those who are not impacted. However, for those impacted by a disaster or sudden 
shock, the experience of the disaster is never gone. The term "return to normal" is 
often used to describe a desired state of return after a disaster or sudden shock, 
however a more accurate term "the new normal," is used to describe this process 
(Mccoll & Burkle 2012) . The new normal offers more respect for the impact of the 
event on the community. The new normal acknowledges that the disaster or sudden 
shock may prevent the return to pre-disaster conditions; for example, rebuilding 
damaged structures does not rebuild the family who suffered a loss of life. An event 
such as the 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary school shooting where 26 people, including 
20 children between six and seven years old, and six adult staff members (Wikipedia, 
2020) were shot and killed is so disturbing that the community is forever altered and 
normal, as it was before the tragedy, is impossible to return to. The new normal 
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acknowledges that disasters and sudden shocks are opportunities to address factors that 
contribute to the impact of disasters. 
Those impacted by disaster are often surrounded by reminders of the event, 
which may result in a state of chronic stress which may serve to keep the disaster alive 
and present for many years. Individuals and communities begin to assume 
responsibility for rebuilding their lives, and people adjust to a new “normal” while 
continuing to grieve losses. The reconstruction phase often begins around the 
anniversary of the disaster and may continue for some time beyond that. Following 
catastrophic events, the reconstruction phase may last for years (Washington 2020). 
For areas experiencing a natural disaster such as tornado or flood, the sight of 
unrepaired homes, blight, empty lots where homes once stood, and anniversaries of the 
event will almost certainly bring a return of the trauma which was experienced 
(Mccoll & Burkle 2012). Even a change in seasons, like the beginning of hurricane 
season in the southern U.S., can bring back trauma, which impacts the wellbeing of 
communities at risk. These constant stressors, be them conscious or subconscious, can 
accumulate and affect communities in ways that are not usually accounted for in 
contemporary emergency management literature and are not usually considered when 
planners and local governments develop master plans. Planners should be aware of the 
possibility of retraumatizing community members during the planning process. There 
also are psychological impacts with long-term adaptive consequences, such as changes 
in risk perception (beliefs in the likelihood of the occurrence a disaster and its personal 
consequences for the individual) and increased hazard intrusiveness (frequency of 
thought and discussion about a hazard) (Lindell 2013). In turn, these beliefs can affect 
risk area residents’ adoption of household hazard adjustments that reduce their 
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vulnerability to future disasters (Lindell 2013). Experiencing a disaster may provide 
more involvement in the planning process and may serve to increase capacity to 
absorb the impact of a disaster. The disaster may forever alter the trajectory of the 
community, and planners must be work with others, especially mental health 
professionals, so that the impact of the disaster can be respected and incorporated into 
the comprehensive planning process. 
Acute Childhood Experiences 
 
Acute Childhood Experiences (ACE's) refer to significant traumas that are 
experienced during childhood, such as escaping extreme violence or in this example 
surviving Hurricane Katrina (CDC, 2019). ACES can create a multitude of mental 
health conditions (Johnson 2018). Children that witnessed the devastation or watched 
parents cope with the storm and aftermath are at a higher risk of mental health 
difficulties as an adult. Increases in mental health crises such as stress and anxiety may 
be felt as the hurricane season approaches. Even storms that bring heavy rain generate 
stress and concern in Broadmoor because it is in one of the lowest areas of the city, 
and it is usually last to drain. Reminders of the destruction of Katrina are brought out 
regularly. This chronic stress condition is detrimental to health and wellbeing; it may 
increase crime and disorder and lower quality of life (Johnson 2018). 
This aspect of disaster recovery was not intended to be explored as part of this 
thesis. However, the research uncovered an area that requires further exploration and 
consideration when developing emergency management and master plans. Emergency 
management and master planners should learn more about the impact of ACE's from 
mental health professionals so that they are better informed about the long-term impact 
that disasters and sudden shocks may present to survivors. Plans should account for 
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these impacts and specify resources that may be available to provide monitoring well 
past the believed recovery period of the event. 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary emergency management in the United States has its roots in the 
Cold-War era community preparation and response to a nuclear threat. The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in the 1970s and modified 
several times until 2001 when it was incorporated under the Department of Homeland 
Security. FEMA identifies four phases of emergency management: Mitigation, 
Preparation, Response, and Recovery. Mitigation and Preparation occur before an 
emergency, Response and Recovery occur during and after the emergency. Recovery, 
though often identified as the last phase, should be considered when creating action 
items, policy, or plans during all other planning phases because these decisions will 
directly impact recovery. Planners may be responsible for maintaining recovery efforts 
long after the acute response to the emergency has passed. Planners may need to 
acknowledge that it may be challenging to engage stakeholders in a hazard mitigation 
planning process in the absence of an emergency. Despite this, planners are uniquely 
poised to see the broader spatial relationships of community, planning, and mitigation, 
which is helpful in the development of plans. The integration of planning and hazard 
mitigation should include the following principles: Keeping future development out of 
known hazard areas, keeping hazards from affecting existing developed areas, and 
strengthening existing development to resist hazards. The coordination with 
emergency managers can assist in these efforts by better informing both planning 
disciplines as their plans are developed. Should a disaster or sudden shock impact the 
community, the response phase will rely on guidance and preparations laid out in the 
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plans. It may minimize the level of damage or disruption to the community. The 
psychological impact of natural disaster or sudden shock can have negative 
consequences on the mental health of those who experience it, especially children. 
Acute Childhood Experiences (ACES) can influence the psychological and emotional 
stability of a child who experienced disaster and the result may not present itself for 
many years. Planners and emergency managers should consult with mental health 
professionals to learn how to incorporate ACES mitigation strategies into their plans. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The importance of communities to prepare for and respond to disaster or 
disruption could not be any more clearly illustrated than right now. As the conclusion 
of this research is written, the United States and the rest of the world is grappling with 
the rapid spread of a global pandemic, Coronavirus (COVID-19). 
COVID-19 could be considered a natural disaster, sudden shock, pandemic, or 
any other myriad of calamities combined into one global event. Communities across 
the world are relying on emergency managers, public health officials, economic 
forecasters, policymakers, and citizens to keep their communities safe from exposure 
to the virus. The disruption this pandemic is creating impacts economic markets, 
employment security, and social cohesion, which may result in instability, concern, 
and in the worst case, possibly panic among the populace. Planning for a pandemic 
may or may not already be incorporated in emergency or master plans. Communities 
that have developed plans for pandemic response are implementing their plans at this 
very moment; however, the speed of exposure and spread of the virus is threatening 
the community's ability to absorb the impact. 
COVID-19 illustrates the various approaches which are needed for the 
successful planning, response, and recovery; similarly, there are different ways to view 
and interpret those approaches. An emergency management practitioner might see that 
systems of addressing the virus impact are being implemented based on established 
emergency management practices. There are organized management practices that are 
being used to dedicate resources accordingly, track cost expenditures, and ensure the 
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safety of responders, healthcare workers, and community stakeholders. Bringing 
subject matter experts from various disciplines (e.g., public health, academic, first 
responders, government) together to provide their knowledge to the overall planning 
and response processes helps inform the response. This process of collaborative 
stakeholder involvement and decision making reduces the unknowns and better 
informs the decisions made in a rapidly changing and uncertain landscape. The 
COVID-19 decision-making process has seen changes. State and federal declarations 
of emergency have been declared. As described earlier, our country is entering the 
response phase of this emergency, and our democratic process of decision making is 
slowly being replaced with an autocratic one, issuing clear directions and making 
strategic decisions designed to keep us safer. Those strategic decisions must be 
informed with information that is provided by subject matter experts; policymakers 
providing direction cannot ignore subject matter expertise. Competing interests must 
be weighed and considered when making policy decisions. In this specific case, the 
public health risks and economic stability risks, are being debated and an educated, 
informed decision must be made to achieve a level of balance which minimizes risk as 
much as possible. 
Rebuilding after a disaster often takes years to complete, and most emergency 
management plans do not account for this long-term process leaving planners to aid 
the community in returning to the "new normal." Through the lens of a regional 
planner, one can see that COVID-19 may severely impact our communities, unlike any 
flood, hurricane, or tornado has. Though property destruction is unlikely as a result of 
the virus, the death of a significant number of our population is a concern. Planners 
cannot prepare for this impact; however, planners and communities are forced to 
 manage the impact on our communities long after the emergency response has 
concluded. The economic impact of the pandemic is likely to create unforeseen 
joblessness in communities. The master planning process often considers the economic 
development of the community, and planners will likely be forced to make 
adjustments to master plans in a post-COVID-19 world. This outcome is an example 
of planners being charged with the long-term recovery after the responders, and 
immediate resources have addressed acute concerns of the disaster. 
As our communities recover from the impact of COVID-19, we will have 
opportunities to meet with various stakeholders to review how we were impacted, how 
we responded, and how we can improve to reduce negative impacts. For example, 
planners can provide demographic information to emergency managers regarding 
high-risk populations, such as the elderly in assisted care facilities or elsewhere, so 
that rapid mitigation efforts can be provided to reduce exposure to the virus. Planners 
will enter these discussions at the policy-making level, responder level, and most 
certainly at the community level. Planners need to listen to the community. They will 
be one of the best sources of information regarding how this disaster was handled. 
Planners have a unique ability to serve as liaisons between the community and the 
local government, and this skill will be critical as our country, and our communities 
recover from this disaster. 
A significant factor in rebuilding a community after a disaster is the attachment 
that the residents have to their communities in the physical sense (e.g., houses, 
neighbors) and the psychological and emotional sense through their attachment to 
social circles and sense of community belonging. Planners must also prepare for the 
long-term impacts of disaster and sudden shock. The psychological impact of disaster 
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 trauma on people may be profound. It may be visible as anniversaries of the event 
come and go, or it may not present itself until many years after the event. As planners 
work with communities that have been impacted by disaster, there must be careful 
consideration of the strategies used to address planning concerns. The psychological 
impact of disaster may remain present for the community, and the planning process 
should take care to avoid re-traumatizing residents as plans are crafted. Subject matter 
experts who are trained in disaster trauma may be a valuable resource for planners so 
that re-traumatizing can be mitigated or avoided. 
Public participation is critical to developing comprehensive and emergency 
management plans, and planners have a unique ability to facilitate public engagement, 
which assists in a whole community approach to the planning process. Through this 
process, civic capacity is identified and developed. Civic capacity increases the ability 
of a community to prepare for and absorb the impacts of disasters. The more a 
community can absorb, the more likely it is to recover quicker and reduce long-term 
negative impacts. Effective integration of hazard mitigation occurs when a 
community's planning framework leads to development patterns that do not increase 
risks from known hazards or leads to redevelopment that reduces risk from known 
hazards. Community planners share the responsibility to seek out their emergency 
management counterparts and become part of the emergency management team to 
determine what shared values and potential solutions are likely to work best for their 
community. The planning approaches taken by emergency managers and regional 
planners should identify each other and suggest or require the sharing of information 
during the planning process to best inform the respective plan development. Planners 
need not be experts in emergency planning or vice versa. Trained practitioners should 
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 complete the development of individual plans. What must be incorporated, however, is 
a mechanism of information sharing and a bridge that facilitates communication 
between the plans and a collaborative partnership before an emergency befalls the 
community. 
Planning the future of a community requires assessing the immediate situation 
and predicting the future. During the development of New Orleans, the immediate 
needs of housing and commerce were addressed by advanced building processes that 
altered the physical environment. One of the lessons learned from this process, now 
300 years later, is that the physical environment wants to return to how it was created. 
As subsidence has continued, New Orleans faces an enormous and never-ending 
process of addressing water management. The case study of Broadmoor, New Orleans, 
illustrates how disaster not only impacts the physical environment but may threaten 
the social and cultural structure of a community. Broadmoor and other neighborhoods 
in New Orleans faced a government taking in order to reduce the likelihood of future 
flooding and to assist in the overall drainage of floodwater in the city. From a planning 
theory perspective, this action may be appropriate, even necessary, to reduce future 
risk to the broader community. However, the execution of this action was 
overshadowed by perceived political corruption, lack of public participation in the 
process, and concerns about racial or socio-economic drivers influencing this action. A 
significant factor in the Broadmoor rebuilding process was the residents' sense of place 
and attachment to their neighborhood. As this neighborhood was threatened with 
forced buyouts, the people became galvanized and used their civic capacity to 
demonstrate that they would not be taken. Underlying community strength and 
organization from the Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA) provided the 
66 
 structure of this grass-roots effort to succeed. Today, Broadmoor continues to provide 
community resources and education designed to prepare the residents for future 
disruption from flooding. The BIA maintains a robust planning function, which is 
based on continuous attention to the needs of the residents, including mental health 
resources, to address trauma from Hurricane Katrina and other flooding events. 
The United States has robust emergency management and hazard mitigation 
structures. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides 
overarching direction, training, and response capabilities to state and local 
governments during times of disaster or sudden shock. Similar systems at state and 
local levels provide more direct services to those communities. As the field of 
emergency management has developed, assessment processes have been created to aid 
communities in identifying known or unknown risks. Tools and strategies have also 
been developed to mitigate damages and respond to disasters more quickly and 
effectively. The processes that planners use to develop master plans can assist in the 
emergency management planning process. When there is a better understanding of the 
built environment, its inhabitants, its limitations, and its potential for impact from 
risks, the community is better prepared to safeguard against a threat. 
In a post-disaster situation, it might be tempting for residents to wait for city, 
state, or federal leaders to take charge and tell them what to do to rebuild. It seems 
counterintuitive that the victims of the disaster should be the ones in charge of their 
recovery. However, the rebuilding of a community cannot be done by government 
alone. City planning departments, city councils, and mayors are vital to the rebuilding 
effort. However, the task of rebuilding an entire community requires the involvement 
of the entire community– a business as usual approach will not work. (Ahlers, 2007). 
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 The Broadmoor rebuilding plan was a community development plan. It happened to be 
the result of a natural disaster, but this served to inform the plan and make changes to 
improve the resiliency of the neighborhood as it transitioned to the new normal. The 
foundation of this process was both to rebuild and to not face a taking from the 
government. This became the base on which a robust public participation process was 
built. Much like rebuilding a house, as the Broadmoor rebuilding and repopulation 
structure took shape, details and finishing touches were identified and completed by 
residents, culminating in a citizen-created plan that received extensive support from 
the residents 
The integration of emergency management and regional planning is supported 
by respective governing bodies and demonstrates the need for collaboration and 
resource sharing. FEMA encourages planners to participate in the emergency 
management planning process. The American Planning Association also encourages 
the integration of hazard mitigation into comprehensive and master plans. In Hazard 
Mitigation: Integrating Best Practices into Planning (2010), Schwab has suggested the 
following strategies to address gaps in collaboration. 
• Act before a disaster. Funding will likely be a consideration, but planners 
should not wait for grant funds; by the time disaster strikes, much of the damage could 
have been prevented through proper planning (Schwab, 2010). Referring to the four- 
step emergency planning process, this type of planning takes place in the Mitigation 
and Preparation phases. It may be difficult to begin or sustain planning for a disaster in 
the absence of immediate threat. Partnering with emergency management from the 
beginning of the planning process can leverage importance of coordinated processes 
and may increase the effectiveness of both plans respectively. 
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 • Mitigation requires patience, monitoring, and continuing evaluation. 
 
Disasters are not built in a day; they are the product of numerous planning and 
political decisions over many years. Mitigation is often hard work that requires 
diligence and political patience. Realize that implementation is often a messy process 
and develop the necessary tools to minimize vulnerability over time (Schwab, 2010). 
The development work that planners do may have a direct impact on the community's 
ability to mitigate, absorb, and recover from a disaster. Planners who understand 
emergency management, or who incorporate emergency managers in the planning 
process will likely mitigate future risk through a design process that provides for 
adequate emergency response to disruption. 
• Planners must account for stakeholder values in light of hazard mitigation. 
 
They should perform an analysis of the interests of local stakeholders in order to 
identify both obstacles and opportunities, and to compare priorities and conflicts. 
Involve others wherever possible (Schwab, 2010). Much like subject matter experts 
who can lend technical expertise to the planning process, local stakeholders are a very 
valuable source of information during hazard and master planning processes. Public 
participation should be a requirement during phases of the planning, and emergency 
management planning process. The case study of Broadmoor, New Orleans illustrates 
that strict top-down policy decisions without stakeholder involvement may create 
larger issues and ultimate failure. Plans that address hazard mitigation and include 
stakeholder input will serve needs more effectively. 
• Emphasize multiple-objective planning. Drawing on such analyses, determine 
where the same program or objective can serve multiple purposes, such as open space 
and bicycle paths in a floodplain that may draw support from fitness advocates, 
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environmentalists, and parks and recreation proponents. Find opportunities for the 
community to discover useful synergy in hazard mitigation (Schwab, 2010). The 
ability for one space to serve multiple purposes may be a significant factor in 
obtaining buy-in from government leaders and community stakeholders. The creation 
of spaces to absorb impact from floods, or wildfires while contributing to the 
development of the community will likely be received favorably. 
• Communicate risks for hazards. Planning is not just concerned with the 
physical development of a community; it is also very much about public education, 
and planning staff must be able to communicate the elements of risk to planning 
commissions and the general public. The community can learn to take responsibility 
for the impacts of its decisions. Enabling those who wish to take foolish risks is not 
good planning (Schwab, 2010). This is a critical area for planners and emergency 
managers to collaborate efforts. A shared approach to communicating risks may be 
most effective as it demonstrates that no one singular voice is serving as an outlier 
voicing concern. Demonstrating the impact of decisions that impact planning and 
hazard mitigation better serves the community and informs policymakers and citizens, 
respectively. 
• Above all, aim for resilience. The long-term goal is a community with the 
will, the resources, and the capacity to bounce back successfully from disaster 
(Schwab, 2010). Planners and emergency managers who share an understanding of the 
other's work can be better suited to develop plans that increase the capacity and 
resilience of the community. They need not work in isolation, a whole community, and 
the all-hazards approach will be the most successful. Both planning process should 
incorporate strategies for physical and emotional resilience. The physical restoration 
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from the impact of a disaster will likely be completed much faster than the 
psychological recovery. Plans should account for the immediate and long-term 
psychological needs of the impacted community. The existence of plans will not stop 
the occurrence of a disaster, but the outcome of the planning process, as described 
here, may reduce the negative impacts of the disaster and contribute to a more robust 
return, or perhaps the improvement of the community's pre-disaster state. 
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